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THE SEARCH FOR FAIR AGENCY PROCESS: The 
Immigration Opinions of Judge Michael 
Daly Hawkins 1994 to 2010 
Lenni B. Benson* 
"We review the work of government agencies with an 
understandable degree of deference. No amount of deference, 
however, can excuse the deliberate, calculated and cumulative 
unfairness which occurred here." 1 
I. THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS 
Judge Michael Daly Hawkins has been a member of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals since 1994; but he has been concerned with the forms and 
varieties of administrative or bureaucratic process his entire career. Perhaps 
because he spent several intense early years as a lawyer in the U.S. Marine 
Corps or because he grew up in a small Arizona town on the edge of the 
Navajo nation, Judge Hawkins has been aware that due process guarantees 
and the quality of the adjudication within a bureaucratic system may be 
even more important than the procedure in general commercial or criminal 
litigation. Judge Hawkins has been a scholar and architect of reform in 
bureaucratic justice. He followed his Marine Corps service by serving as the 
U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona from 1976 to 1980. At 31, he was 
the youngest U.S. attorney in Arizona history. In the private sector, he made 
• Professor of Law, New York Law School. I had the great honor of working for Judge 
Hawkins in my first job after graduation from Arizona State University's College of Law in 
1983. He was then a partner at Dushoffand Sacks. I was fortunate to continue to work with him 
when he formed the firm of Daughton, Hawkins and Bacon and later become his partner when 
that firm merged with Bryan Cave. I entered academia in the summer of 1994 just as he joined 
the federal judiciary. I owe him many professional debts but notwithstanding those debts, I 
know that one of Judge Hawkins's highest values is professional integrity and I have done my 
best to both praise and critique his contributions to the field of immigration law during his 
service as a Judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As he continues as a Senior Judge, I 
trust that he is far from finished in making contributions to this field and will make many more. 
I would like to thank New York Law students Margaret Laufrnan (class of 2010) and Claire R. 
Thomas (class of 2011) for their many contributions to this article. I also benefitted from the 
comments of Nancy-Jo Merritt, Mathilde Cohen, and Anna 0. Law. 
1. Hawkins dissenting in Circu v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2004). As is 
discussed infra the case was reheard en bane and remanded to the agency for reconsideration. 
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significant contributions to local, state and national bar associations and 
through pro bono leadership within private firms. He made a long lasting 
and significant contribution during his years of service as a volunteer on the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). 2 From 1989 to 
1994, Judge Hawkins served on the ACUS. During this period, ACUS 
commissioned and analyzed several in-depth seminal studies of 
immigration adjudication. Michael Hawkins, with his ACUS colleagues 
from government, the judiciary, and the private sector, hammered out real 
world recommendations for this complex field and many of their 
recommendations became law either through legislative or administrative 
reforms. 3 When he became a member of the federal judiciary, his role was 
clearly altered. However, his commitment to fairness and integrity in 
adjudication remained undiminished. This article will explore some of 
Judge Hawkins's many immigration decisions, both majority and dissenting 
opinions, which reflect his commitment to the preservation of a due process. 
It is the pain and irony of bureaucratic legal process that the people 
subjected to bureaucratic process are least able to navigate its complexity. 
The most critical and life-changing decisions are often made by the small 
claims court, the tribunal authority or the administrative adjudicator. 
Moreover, the substantive and procedural rules within these specialty 
bureaus may also be some of the most complex and contain labyrinths that 
would ensnare even the most able and experienced advocate. Finding 
competent, affordable counsel, training agency adjudicators and 
administrators, and balancing crushing workloads against political pressure 
to produce are just some of the ordinary challenges of bureaucratic process. 
The last long tail of bureaucratic process may be judicial review, yet the 
doctrines and traditions of judicial review of administrative action constrain 
2. The ACUS is an intergovernmental agency created by Congress to study issues of 
administrative process. The Arizona State Law Journal devoted an entire issue to a symposium 
discussing the legacy of the ACUS. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Contrasting Perspectives on the 
Deeds and Demise of the Administrative Conference: Is There a Determinable Legacy?, 30 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1998). After a twenty year period of desuetude, Congress has reauthorized 
funding for the ACUS in 2010. Hearings on the Administrative Conference of the United States 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong 
(2010) (Statement of Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law, 
Washington College of Law, American University), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/Lubbers 100520. pdf. 
3. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency 
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297 (1986); David A. 
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1247 (1990). Both of these important law review articles were informed by empirical 
studies conducted on behalf of the ACUS that gave these authors access to the government 
official involved in managing the agency procedures. These and similar studies made real and 
lasting reforms for immigration adjudications. 
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the scope of judicial review because our society values the efficiency and 
independence of the administrative action. 
Immigration law is a species of administrative law. For the vast majority 
of people who are touched by immigration law, every interaction is with 
one bureau of the federal government: the Department of Homeland 
Security ("DHS"). 4 As in other forms of federal administrative law, an 
individual aggrieved by an adverse agency action has, after exhaustion of 
the administrative process, recourse through the federal courts for limited 
judicial review. Since 1961, Congress has largely channeled the judicial 
review of final removal to the federal courts of appeals bypassing the 
federal district courts. 5 In the past fifteen years, during Judge Hawkins's 
tenure as a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the immigration 
workload of the federal courts has grown exponentially and now represents 
around 13% to 20% of the appellate docket.6 This growth has been even 
4. In 2002 Congress reorganized the immigration control functions and created a new 
cabinet level agency, entitled the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). The former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice became part ofDHS. Only 
the immigration administrative court, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") 
and the appellate litigation team in the Office oflmmigration Litigation ("OIL") remained in the 
Department of Justice under the control of the Attorney General. See Department of Justice 
Agencies, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2011); Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart, DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
5. While the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, provides for judicial 
review of federal agency action, Congress has carved out limits to the form and scope of judicial 
review of removal orders. In 1996 and again in 2005 Congress amended § 242 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1381, in an effort to streamline judicial 
review in this area. As I have written elsewhere, the attempt to cut off access did not lead to 
decline in the volume of petitions and moreover, increased the complexity and 
constitutionalization of the field. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here: 
Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405 (2007) 
[hereinafter Benson, You Can't Get There] (suggesting that reform cannot be focused simply on 
judicial review but must incorporate the various factors that interact within the system); Lenni 
B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative 
Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007) 
[hereinafter Benson, Making Paper Dolls] (evaluating why cuts lead to greater volume of work 
and providing demographic data on the immigration workload of the federal courts); Lenni B. 
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration 
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997) [hereinafter Benson, Back to the Future] (analyzing 
why limiting judicial review to constitutional issues will increase the constitutionalization of 
immigration law generating a greater number of due process and other constitutional 
challenges); Lenni B. Benson, The 'New World' of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. 
lMMIGR. L.J. 233, 233-64 (1998) [hereinafter Benson, New World of Judicial Review] 
(providing a description of the 1996 changes and an explanation of prior structure for judicial 
review of deportation and exclusion orders). 
6. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: 
PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 
10 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
more profound in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which represents the 
court with the largest number of immigration cases and the highest 
percentage of immigration cases on its docket. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals received 3,351 petitions for review in immigration 
removal cases. 7 This figure represented 27% of their total docket of 12,211 
cases for 2009. 8 
The administration of such a large volume of cases, a caseload that has 
grown exponentially, has obviously required the judicial administration of 
the court to consider approaches to managing the workload.9 The Ninth 
Circuit has utilized a variety of approaches including: greater reliance on 
staff attorneys to prepare analysis of cases, 10 decisions that are not 
designated for formal publication, 11 dispensing with oral argument in some 
ADJUDICTION OF REMOVAL CASES 4-1, 4-2 (2010); see also Benson, You Can't Get There, supra 
note 5; Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 5 at 47. There was a marked 26% decline in 
the number of immigration related petitions between 2008 and 2009 despite an overall increase 
of 6% in the total workload of the court. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2010), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx. While final BIA decisions declined 13% in 
the same time period, the decline is still quite marked. 
The percentage of immigration related cases is even higher if criminal cases are added. The 
federal government has dramatically increased the number of immigration related criminal 
prosecutions. See TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT, SURGE IN IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS 
CONTINUES (2008), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188/. According to the 
2009 Ninth Circuit Annual Report, criminal appeals accounted for 13.7% of the total, with 
appeals involving criminal immigration offenses ranking as the second only to criminal appeals 
involving drug offenses. See U.S. DIST. COURTS, 2009 NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT 40 
(2010), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/ Annua1Report2009.pdf. 
7. See id. 
8. Id. 
9. See Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 5 (discussing the rapid, exponential 
growth in the volume of immigration appeals); see also, John R.B. Palmer, The Second 
Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers": Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. 
L. REv. 965 (2006) (discussing the growth nationwide in immigration appeals). 
10. In the Ninth Circuit, the Office of the Staff Attorneys ("OSA") "consists of over 35 
attorneys who work for the entire court instead of for a single judge. Staff attorneys review the 
motions in all of the court's cases, and research and present them to the judges for decision." 
See Appellate Court Participants, OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXEC., HISTORY AND GUIDE TO THE 
U.S. COURTS, http://207.41.19.15/web/sdocuments.nsf/94dcdf31963df55d88256453006e 
368f/9f803c4b86ed923c882564530083dl 59?0penDocument (last visited Feb. 24, 2011 ). 
11. When the Ninth Circuit publishes a decision that is nonprecedential the decision is 
called a "memorandum" and not an "opinion." The court then marks the decision with this 
footnote: "This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3." See e.g., Rutledge v. United States, No. 09-15198, Mem. at 1 (9th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Folsum, No. 10-50119, Mem. at 1 (9th Cir. 2011); see also U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR., FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, NINTH 
CIRCUIT RULES, CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 36-3(a), available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/rules.htm. There is a significant body of 
43:0007] SEARCH FOR FAIR AGENCY PROCESS 11 
dispositions, 12 use of en bane panels to resolve some important issues, 13 and 
the education and training of attorneys who regularly represent immigrants 
in the circuit. 14 
Certainly, one member of the entire Ninth Circuit judiciary was not 
single-handedly responsible for designing or implementing any of these 
reforms, but Judge Hawkins has taken an active role in many ways. He has 
organized formal training for the incoming law clerks. He has participated 
in annual trainings for immigration attorneys whom the court's staff 
identifies as repeatedly presenting deficient or inadequate briefs. He has 
literature discussing the impact of courts issuing nonprecedential decisions. See, e.g., Hillel Y. 
Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the Federal Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973 (2008); see 
also, William R. Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinons on the 
Process of Legal Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 429 (2003). 
12. The Ninth Circuit rules allow the panel to decide a case without oral argument. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2) (stating "[o]ral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel 
of three judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument 
is unnecessary .... "); Telephone Interview by Claire Thomas with Denise Leonard, Assistant 
Info. Sys. Manager for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 22, 2010) (indicating that 
during the twelve month period ending June 2010, the court heard 1,809 arguments and 6,743 
cases were decided after procedural rulings and 4,225 cases ended after submission of brief). 
Based on these numbers, an estimated 63% of the appeals were handled without oral argument 
in that twelve month period. See also David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, 
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) (criticizing the 
number of unpublished decisions). 
13. "En bane" cases are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in panels 
consisting of the Chief Judge of the Circuit and ten other judges selected more or less at random 
from the active judges on the appellate court. See FED. R. APP. P. 35; 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (revised 
Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/rules. 
htm#l 109234. 
According to FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(l), a petition may be made for a hearing or rehearing en 
bane when: 
the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the 
conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore 
necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or the 
proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each 
of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a 
proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an 
issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of 
other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue. 
See ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 158-162 (2010) (providing a 
scholarly examination of the immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit and some of the approaches 
used to manage the workload). 
14. Telephone Interview with Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals (Aug. 25, 2010) (describing mandatory "moot court" training for attorneys who are 
unable to demonstrate competence as appellate counsel. The training instructs attorneys on the 
elements of appellate briefs, the rules of appellate procedure and the observation of skilled 
appellate advocates presenting oral argument.). 
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helped to recruit attorneys from the government and the private bar to 
present mock oral arguments and commentary to attorneys so that the 
quality of representation can improve. 15 
Still, the reality of immigration adjudication in the Ninth Circuit is that 
there are a vast number of non-precedential, "unpublished" decisions issued 
by three judge panels with a heavy role for the staff attorneys drafting all or 
parts of the opinion. It is in this context that we examine the key 
immigration cases of Judge Hawkins, knowing that no immigration opinion 
can be written in the Ninth Circuit without an understanding that perhaps 
one hundred or more immigration cases may be decided in a month within 
the Ninth Circuit alone. 
In an interview with Juan Osuna, a former member of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), I learned that in 2003-04 the BIA 
recognized a need for increased communication and contact with federal 
judges. Mr. Osuna reported that "the BIA reached out to the Ninth Circuit 
and invited one or more of the judges to attend an annual conference of the 
BIA and to speak directly to the members of the BIA and the Board's 
attorney staff. Judge Hawkins accepted and his presentation was very well 
received." 16 Based on the initial meeting Judge Hawkins also worked with 
the leadership of the Ninth Circuit and other Circuit Courts to understand 
the changes within the Department of Justice that are contributing to the 
exponential growth in petitions for review. 17 Judge Hawkins invited 
members of the BIA and its leadership to attend annual meetings of the 
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. 18 These initial meetings were the 
beginning of a process that continues today and has expanded to Judges of 
the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit meeting with leadership 
of the BIA. 19 Juan Osuna also reported that judges from other circuits have 
also participated in productive conversations and exchanges about judicial 
administration. 20 
15. Interview with Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, supra note 14. 
16. Telephone Interviews with Juan Osuna, former Chairman, Board of Immigration 
Appeals (conducted between Aug. and Oct. 22, 2010). The comments of Mr. Osuna are his 
personal recollections and are not meant to reflect the official opinion of the Department of 
Justice or the U.S. government. Mr. Osuna was a member of the Board oflmmigration Appeals 
from August 2000 to 2009. He served as chairman of the BIA from September 2008 to May 
2009. In 2009 and 2010 he held other positions of responsibility within the Department of 
Justice and as of January 2011 he is the Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review. See Meet the Director, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/meetdir.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
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This positive assessment from the former chair of the BIA is an example 
of how Judge Hawkins is able to build communication even if he is engaged 
in a serious critique of the agency performance. For example, Judge 
Hawkins reported in an interview he gave following a high level meeting 
with officials from the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), 
that he seriously discussed "shaming" by the Circuit Courts as a possible 
way to improve adjudication before the agency.21 He said that the audience 
applauded when he suggested that the Ninth Circuit could easily improve 
adjudication before the EOIR by naming immigration judges in its 
opinions. 22 This is a federal judicial practice that Chairman Osuana strongly 
opposes. 23 
By suggesting that opinions name the immigration judges, Judge 
Hawkins seriously endorsed a need for greater transparency and 
accountability. The volume of the cases, the lack of support resources such 
as court personnel and law clerks, the existing management culture and 
practices have created a cloud of anonymity. Moreover, the difficulty of 
managing complex decision-making required by deportation and asylum 
cases combined with all of these factors to reduce the effectiveness and 
quality of the adjudication in the immigration courts. 24 Appellate courts can 
remand erroneous decisions to the agency and can point out procedural 
errors, but they have no funds to address the budget shortfalls of the 
administrative adjudicator, nor can they create statutory substantive and 
procedural reforms that might reduce the problems and thus the rate of 
appeal. 
When an immigration case reaches the federal courts, the entire removal 
proceeding record is transmitted to the court. Judicial review requires that 
21. See Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal 
Appellate Courts: As Caseloads Skyrocket, Judges Blame the Work Done by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at l, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/02/local/me-backlog2/5. 
22. While the Ninth Circuit does not routinely name individual immigration judges in its 
decisions, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals names the judge at the top comer of the slip 
opinions posted on the court's website and formally names them in the body of the opinion. 
This was a procedure I recommended as a way of increasing transparency and accountability 
and allowing individual immigration judges to find appellate case law addressing their 
administrative decisions. See Benson, You Can't Get There, supra note 5, at 427; see also 
Sydenham B. Alexander, A Political Response to the Crisis in Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. 
lMMIGR. L.J. 1, 31 n.161 (2006) (calling for reforms in the administrative process). 
23. Telephone Interviews with Juan Osuna, supra note 16. 
24. The vast majority of the opinions prepared by immigration judges are dictated and few 
are formally published. Of the more than 30,000 decisions rendered by the appellate body, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, only a fraction are formally published or made available on the 
agency website. See AG/BIA Decisions Listing, EOIR VIRTUAL LAW LIBRARY, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib_indecitnet.htrnl (last visited Feb. 25, 2011 ). 
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the court consider the entire record-a record that can easily exceed 400 to 
600 pages in a contested asylum case. Moreover, immigration court 
proceedings are not officially transcribed. The proceedings are recorded and 
a transcript is only prepared if there is an appeal. These transcripts can be 
rough, both because the pace of the litigation is quite fast and because the 
average immigration judge handles a docket of more than 1,200 cases a 
year. Unfortunately, most of the arguments, motions and decisions 
presented in removal proceedings are made orally. The press of the 
immigration court docket requires immigration judges to dictate a final 
decision with rarely an opportunity to edit and rewrite the final order.25 
Well aware of these practical and budgetary limitations, Judge Hawkins and 
other members of the federal judiciary have tried to work with leadership 
within the EOIR to improve the procedures and the court's workloads. In 
testimony before Congress, several members of the federal judiciary decried 
the lack of resources for immigration judges, a problem Judge Hawkins 
frequently noted. 26 
When I asked Juan Osuna to evaluate Judge Hawkins contribution, he 
responded that the Judge's efforts: 
have been critically important to exchange information and ideas 
that make the process work better. The federal courts have learned 
much more about the process of adjudication of cases in the 
immigration court system, including the overwhelming numbers of 
cases, the resource constraints that the immigration courts work 
under, the complexity of the legal and factual issues that come 
before immigration judges and the BIA, and the various federal 
government players that have a significant role in the process. 27 
He continued to say that the BIA and immigration courts also benefitted 
from the exchange: 
The immigration courts and the BIA have learned first-hand from 
Judge Hawkins and others about the issues that the federal courts 
see, about how federal judges look at the immigration cases that 
reach them, and about recurring problems that arise in cases and 
ideas on how to address them. This has informed and contributed 
to an overall improvement in the process at all levels. 28 
25. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BARASS'N, supra note 6, at 3-16. 
26. See, e.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Chief Judge John M. Walker, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony .cfm?id= l 845&wit_id=52 l 4. 
27. Telephone Interviews and Emails with Juan Osuna, supra note 16. 
28. Id. 
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Judge Hawkins and other members of the Ninth Circuit have also 
commented that the government attorneys representing the government in 
the removal hearings also have a responsibility for the development of an 
adequate administrative record. 29 In an interview, Judge Hawkins said it is 
quite distressing to see government counsel failing to take an adequate role 
to clarify an important factual point in a record, or responding with silence 
to counsel's statutory arguments about a respondent's eligibility for relief. 30 
Judge Hawkins said it is critical to the efficiency and accuracy of the 
administrative system that the "government has a duty to do justice and that 
means being prepared and engaged in an administrative process."31 For 
example, in Cinapian v. Holder, Judge Hawkins found that the government 
made a mistake in failing to notify the respondents in advance of the 
hearing that the government would challenge their documents establishing 
prior residence in Iran. 32 This type of ambush was a shortcut that became a 
mistake requiring remand. 33 
While Congress and the Department of Justice must shoulder the 
responsibility for full reform, the federal circuit courts can affect some 
change. In the next section of this article, I will address several of the cases 
in which Judge Hawkins presented majority or dissenting opinions that 
strongly indicate how the federal judiciary must continue to serve as (1) the 
guardians of individual rights, (2) the necessary protector of government 
independence, and (3) at times, the engine for reform. 
II. A REFEREE WHO WILL CALL A FOUL 
Scholars of administrative law and immigration law know that the scope 
of review is narrow and extremely deferential to the agencies. Moreover, 
since the late 1880s, immigration cases have developed a jurisprudence 
resulting in an extremely deferential doctrine-the plenary power 
doctrine-that may insulate government action from even constitutional 
limitations.34 Still, since 1903, the Supreme Court has affirmed that people 
29. John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 907--09 (2006) 
(citing a transcript from an immigration case and noting that the trial attorney did nothing to 
improve or clarify the administrative record). 
30. Interview with Judge Michael Hawkins, supra note 14. 
31. Id. 
32. 567 F.3d 1067, 1076 (2009). 
33. Id. at 1076-77. 
34. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1703 (1992) 
(explaining how courts focus on procedure to give non-citizens opportunities perhaps in part 
because they lack full incorporation into the substantive protections of the Constitution). 
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within the United States are entitled to due process of law and immigration 
hearings must meet a minimum guarantee of due process to ensure that the 
hearing is not fundamentally unfair. 35 Thus, in some rare circumstances, 
members of the federal judiciary will examine the procedures used by the 
government to secure a removal order and find that the government has 
gone beyond those very broad limits of fundamental fairness. 
Still, while judicial review is structured through the lens of 
administrative law, Judge Hawkins never seems to lose understanding of the 
larger context that removal decisions are as important as most criminal 
cases and in many situations much more significant to the lives involved. So 
while his opinions stay within the structure of judicial review of agency 
action, they reflect a real concern for the process used to adjudicate the facts 
and although he cannot alter the substantive rules, he is willing to question 
whether the rules are being applied fairly. 
His opinions show a preference for representation, evidence, notice, 
accurate translation, remedies for long delays, matters of context, separation 
of powers, and acknowledgement of the problems in the system. 
For example, in a case where the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 
rejected a woman's claim that she never received notice of her removal 
hearing and in the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia hearing to 
allow her to apply for cancellation of removal, the government argued for a 
very high burden of proof to establish the existence of a negative-that she 
prove she did not receive notice sent by regular mail. 36 In Salta v. INS, 37 the 
government argued it was appropriate to place the burden on the respondent 
to establish a lack of notice because both the BIA and the Ninth Circuit had 
previously ruled that if an individual is challenging receipt of service where 
the government used certified mail, the challenger had to provide evidence 
that her mailing address has remained unchanged, that neither she 
nor a responsible party working or residing at that address refused 
service, and that there was nondelivery or improper delivery by 
the Postal Service, then she has rebutted the presumption of 
effective service. If this is the case, the burden shifts to the INS to 
show that a responsible party refused service. 38 
35. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional 
Requirement of 'Some Evidence', 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 637 (1988) (discussing early 
immigration cases and the due process requirement that removal orders be supported by "some 
evidence"). 
36. Salta v. 1.N.S., 314 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1079 (quoting Arrieta v. l.N.S., 117 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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Judge Hawkins wrote that while this burden of proof might make sense 
if an individual is challenging certified mail, 
delivery by regular mail does not raise the same "strong 
presumption" as certified mail, and less should be required to 
rebut such a presumption. Indeed, many of the previously required 
forms of evidence, such as documentary evidence from the Postal 
Service or proof that no responsible person refused service, only 
make sense in the context of certified mail. We therefore hold that 
it was an abuse of discretion for the BIA and the IJ to apply the 
[higher] evidentiary requirements in denying Salta's motion to 
reopen. 39 
The panel then remanded the case to the BIA for remand to the Immigration 
Judge to allow Ms. Salta to supply an affidavit of non-receipt and for the 
agency to consider whether this type of evidence alone should be sufficient 
where the government only used regular mail. 40 
This decision is a good example of Judge Hawkins acting as referee. He 
is not "calling the game" and mandating that the agency reopen the 
proceedings, but instead, he patiently explains where the agency 
overstepped the line in shifting burdens and reminds it of the important 
context, that Ms. Salta was a person who had initially appeared for her 
hearing and sought an opportunity to submit relief-relief only available to 
someone who had lived more than ten years within the United States. While 
it may be understandable why the agency would want to defend notice by 
regular mail, the blind application of a higher burden of proof used to rebut 
certified mail makes it almost impossible for an individual to prove lack of 
notice. 41 
While the government and agency adjudicators might prefer a "bright 
line" rule that shifts the burden uniformly to the challenger to disprove 
notice, Judge Hawkins's decision, while decided on general statutory and 
regulatory grounds, echoes the constitutional case law on the importance of 
providing adequate notice. 42 
The INA permits service of NT As and hearing notices either in 
person or by mail. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c). Service by mail is 
statutorily sufficient so long as the notice was sent to "the last 
address provided by the alien in accordance with subsection 
(a)(l)(F) of this section." Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) 
(authorizing IJs to enter removal orders in absentia only "if the 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1080. 
41. There is no reported decision issued after remand. 
42. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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Service establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convmcmg 
evidence that . . . notice was . . . provided at the most recent 
address provided under section 1229(a)(l)(F) of this title."). What 
it means to be an address "provided under section 1229(a)(l)(F)," 
in tum, was the focus of Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181 
(BIA 2001) (en bane), which held that an alien can be said to have 
"provided" his address to the Service "under"§ 1229(a)(l)(F) only 
if he has actually received, or can be fairly charged with receiving, 
the specific advisals and warnings enumerated at § 1229(a)(l)(F) 
[footnote omitted] regarding the consequences of his failure to 
provide and update his address once removal proceedings have 
begun. That advisal is usually conveyed to an alien for the first 
time in an NTA. G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 187. Because the 
parties agree that Al Mutarreb never actually received his NTA, 
G-Y-R-'s application in this case turns upon whether Al Mutarreb 
can be "properly charged" with having received notice. The parties 
agree that whether an alien is properly charged with receiving an 
NT A he did not in fact get requires a due process inquiry-
whether the method of service is "'reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to appri[ s ]e interested parties of the pendency 
of the action."' Matter of M- D-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 542 (BIA 
2002) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)); accord 
Farhoudv. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997).43 
Like the referee who ensures that the play is fair for persons involved in 
a sports event, Judge Hawkins ensured that all participants in his courtroom 
were allotted their due process rights. His decisions reflect a concern for 
ensuring that procedural safeguards do not go by the wayside simply 
because the respondent is not a citizen of the United States. 
For example, in Colmenar v. INS, Judge Hawkins reviewed a decision of 
the BIA denying asylum to a native and citizen of the Philippines. 44 
Colmenar's claim was based on political persecution. Judge Hawkins found 
that Colmenar was not given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence 
in support of his asylum claim in his hearing before an immigration judge. 
The immigration judge indicated at the beginning of the hearing that he had 
already judged Colmenar's case referring to the case as, "a possible medical 
malpractice suit rather than anything else."45 The immigration judge also 
refused to allow Colmenar to testify regarding certain details, which would 
43. Al Mutarreb v. Holder, 561 F.3d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2009). 
44. 210 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2000). 
45. Id. at 969. 
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have provided elaboration of his fears. 46 Judge Hawkins closed his decision 
with strong language: 
Judges do little to impress the world that this country is the last 
best hope for freedom by displaying the hard hand and closed 
mind of the forces asylum seekers are fleeing. Better that we hear 
these claims out fully and fairly and then make an informed 
judgment on the merits. This is consistent with our role as judges, 
and the values of our Constitution demand no less. 47 
Additionally, in Lopez-Galarza v. INS, Judge Hawkins reviewed a BIA 
decision in which a native and citizen of Nicaragua and her son were 
ordered removed from the U.S. 48 In this case, Ms. Lopez-Galarza had been 
raped, sexually-abused and physically imprisoned on account of her 
political opinion.49 Judge Hawkins stated that "[i]n exercising its discretion 
to deny asylum in this case, the BIA simply failed to consider the level of 
atrocity of past persecution as the law of this Circuit and the BIA's own 
precedent requires."50 Judge Hawkins criticized the BIA and explained that 
"[b ]ecause the BIA deviated from the law of this Circuit as well as from its 
own precedent, its decision was 'contrary to law' and therefore an abuse of 
decision."51 Judge Hawkins decided that Ms. Lopez-Galarza established her 
eligibility for asylum through a sufficient demonstration of past 
persecution. 52 By remanding her case back to the BIA in order to allow the 
BIA panel to decide whether Ms. Lopez-Garcia and her son were entitled to 
asylum as a matter of discretion, Judge Hawkins again took on the role of a 
referee. 
At times, Judge Hawkins has had to raise his objections by dissent. In 
Circu v. Ashcroft, the Immigration Judge relied on a State Department 
report describing human rights and religious freedom in Romania. 53 This 
46. Id. at 970. 
47. Id. at 973. 
48. 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996). 
49. Id. at 957. 
50. Id. at 963. 
51. Id. Prior to 1996, federal courts could reverse a BIA decision where the agency abused 
its discretion, a standard but difficult hurdle in judicial review of administrative action. One of 
the changes made to the scope of judicial review after 1996 was to insulate all decisions 
committed to agency discretion from judicial review. Recently the ABA Commission on 
Immigration published a report calling for the restoration of judicial review of abuse of 
discretion. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, at 3-9; see also Daniel 
Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the 'Rule' of 
Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 161 (2006). 
52. Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 960. 
53. 389 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated en bane sub nom. Circu v. Gonzales, 450 
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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report was dated two years after the original removal hearing. According to 
the Immigration Judge, this report contradicted the Respondent's claim of 
religious persecution. 54 The Immigration Judge gave no notice to the 
Respondent and used the report a full two years after the original hearing 
was held. 55 Further, this error was appealed to the BIA but the Board found 
no error in failing to give the Respondent notice and opportunity to respond 
to the report. 56 Judge Hawkins noted that this was untenable and he 
vigorously dissented. 57 He found that immigration judge's use of a 
controversial report without providing an opportunity to Ms. Circu to 
respond was a violation of fundamental fairness. 58 Later the case was 
reheard en bane and although Judge Hawkins was not a member of that en 
bane panel, the Ninth Circuit adopted his position and remanded the case to 
the agency saying that the BIA's action had violated due process and 
prejudiced the Respondent. 59 
Judge Hawkins also demonstrated his concern for ensuring the due 
process of participants in his courtroom in the case of Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 
which involved an Egyptian national who claimed he was persecuted 
through economic sanctions for his failure to convert to Islam. 60 At the 
master calendar hearing, 61 Tawadrus was represented by counsel. 62 The 
immigration judge set a date for a merits hearing, but counsel could not 
make it, and the immigration judge reset the merits hearing for six months 
later. 63 Tawadrus objected to the new date stating he had to get his case 
heard as expeditiously as possible in order to get his children out of Egypt. 64 
The immigration judge moved the hearing to the same afternoon. 65 Citing a 
schedule conflict, Tawadrus' counsel withdrew.66 Tawadrus appeared later 
that afternoon and proceeded without counsel. 67 The immigration judge 
denied asylum and withholding. 68 Tawadrus (with new counsel) appealed 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 942. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 941-43. 
58. Id. at 943. 
59. Circu v. Gonzales, 450 F. 3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006). 
60. 364 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). 
61. A master calendar hearing is usually the first hearing in a removal case. The hearing is 
used by the immigration judge to determine the scope of the pleadings and the issues in 
contention and to identify what relief, if any, the respondent will seek in a "merits hearing." 





67. Id. at 1102. 
68. Id. 
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the decision to the BIA. 69 The BIA summarily affirmed the decision of the 
immigration judge without opinion. 70 Judge Hawkins again located the right 
to counsel among the rights within the Fifth Amendment guaranteed by due 
process. 71 Judge Hawkins found that the immigration judge's failure to 
inquire specifically whether petitioner wished to continue without a lawyer 
and receive a knowing and voluntary affirmative response was an effective 
denial of right to counsel. 72 By not having counsel, Tawadrus was unable to 
present a clear and internally consistent account and also unknowingly 
abandoned claims for relief. These failures established that Mr. Tawadrus 
was prejudiced by the immigration judge action. 73 
Further, in Cinapian v. Holder, Judge Hawkins addressed the importance 
of rights related to the admission of evidence in his courtroom. In this case, 
the Iranian respondents claimed persecution on account of religion. 74 To 
corroborate their claim, Respondents provided a certificate from an 
Armenian church and an original birth certificate of the husband.75 DHS 
submitted these documents for forensic analysis. 76 The DHS attorney made 
the forensic reports available to petitioners for the first time at their asylum 
hearing. 77 Counsel for the Respondents objected, claiming that the reports 
should have been available prior to the hearing so that the Respondents had 
an opportunity to review and respond to the content. 78 Further, 
Respondents' counsel should have had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
author of the reports. 79 The immigration judge refused to reset the case or 
grant a continuance to allow time to respond to the forensic evidence. 80 
Further, the immigration judge eventually concluded that the Respondents 
were not credible because they could not present evidence to corroborate 
that the family had lived in Iran. 81 
Judge Hawkins pointed out that while the Federal Rules of Evidence do 
not formally apply in immigration proceedings, "evidence is admissible 
only if it is probative, and its use is fundamentally fair." 82 Judge Hawkins 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 1103. 
72. Id. at 1103-05. 
73. Id. at 1106. 
74. 567 F.3d 1067, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009). 
75. Id. at 1071. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1071-72. 
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stressed the importance of the right to confront evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses in immigration cases. 83 He concluded that the failure of the 
government to make the reports available in advance of the hearing or to 
make the report's author available for cross-examination combined with the 
immigration judge's subsequent consideration of the reports, denied the 
Iranian respondents a fair hearing. 84 
In dissent, Judge Hawkins identified the challenge of judicial review of 
administrative hearings that inadequately develop a claim for asylum: 
Asylum cases, by their very nature, are difficult to review. The 
claims relate to events in faraway places, often described by 
individuals who speak an unfamiliar language, and rarely, if ever, 
does the government present evidence. The asylum seeker's 
testimony is often the sole basis for decision, and the hearing 
transcript, in turn, provides the sole basis for our review .... 
Because an adequate record is so essential to meaningful review, 
we as an appellate body must insist on a record that is properly 
translated and transcribed. Because this record cannot even 
charitably be described as adequate, I believe the proper course 
would be to grant the petition for review and remand the transcript 
for clarification. 85 
Moreover, Judge Hawkins seems well aware that the complexity of 
immigration law with its multiple agency divisions, the variety of visa 
petitions and procedures, and the lack of coordination within the agency can 
also create fundamental unfairness. In a case regarding a Congolese 
woman's right to immigrate through marriage, Judge Hawkins took the time 
in the dissent to unwind the complex procedural history of the case. He 
began by patiently explaining: 
This case brings Abbott & Costello's "Who's on First" routine 
to life. A woman seeks a visa as the spouse of a United States 
citizen. Her husband first signs the application on her behalf, then 
withdraws it saying the marriage was a sham, only to file a second 
application, saying the withdrawal was done in haste and that the 
marriage was legitimate all along. In the meantime, making use of 
the husband's initial withdrawal, the government seeks and 
obtains a removal order based on marriage fraud. She appeals the 
removal order to the BIA. When her visa application is denied, she 
appeals that also and asks the BIA to consolidate the two 
obviously related matters. Without explanation, the BIA fails to 
83. Id. at 1073-75. 
84. Id. at 1075. 
85. Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d. 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
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act on Ngongo's efforts to consolidate and her cases proceed on 
two tracks, as two separate appeals. Not only does the BIA fail to 
act on Ngongo's consolidation request, it sends the visa denial to a 
BIA merits panel, and, at nearly the same time, sends the removal 
appeal to a single BIA member for summary affirmance. 86 
23 
Unlike the majority of the panel who affirmed the removal order, it is 
clear that Judge Hawkins was willing to untangle a bureaucratic mess. At 
the end of his dissent he wrote: 
Without even asking for an explanation, the panel majority 
seems content to approve the removal (deportation) of someone 
the agency says has entered into a fraudulent marriage, while the 
same agency finds no proof that fraudulent marriage exists. No 
responsible, sane system of justice should sanction such a result. 
Alphonsine Ngongo is either eligible to proceed with her visa 
application or removable because of fraudulent marriage-she 
cannot be both. 87 
Throughout his opinions this search for fairness and rationality is evident 
as he digs through the brush and bramble of immigration cases and 
administrative obfuscation. Not every judge works as hard as Judge 
Hawkins to try to not only produce the right result in the particular case, but 
to educate the public and the bureaucracy about the defects of the 
immigration procedures at the same time. 
III. PRESERVING THE ROLE OF THE COURT 
Judge Hawkins joined the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the fall of 
1994.88 In 1996 Congress passed two bills amending the provisions 
governing judicial review of removal proceedings. 89 For the next ten years, 
the federal courts heard frequent arguments from both individual and 
government counsel about the scope and form of judicial review in this 
area. 90 When the restrictions on judicial review of immigration cases first 
became law, many, including a significant number of federal judges, 
86. Ngongo v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 826. 
88. Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 2009: Speakers, Panelists and Special Guests, U.S. 
COURTS 9TH CIRCUIT, OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXEC., http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jc2009/ 
promo/speakers.html#hawkins (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
89. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214; Illegallmmigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-54. 
90. Seeking Review Symposium, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
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believed that the Congress had exercised legitimate authority in foreclosing 
judicial review of many types of claims. 91 On its face, the language of the 
statute certainly purports to close the courthouse to claims by aliens in 
expedited removal proceedings, to aliens who have been convicted of 
aggravated felonies, and to preclude review of claims where the ultimate 
decision about relief is committed to the agency discretion. 92 But as the 
litigation developed, two major themes undergirded the ability of non-
citizens to seek review: (1) if the case law did not clearly establish that a 
particular conviction fit the categorical bar, he or she continued to have a 
right to judicial review; and (2) if a petition for review was barred, the 
individual might have continued access to federal courts via a writ of 
habeas corpus. 93 In this first category of cases, one of the critical aspects of 
the doctrine is the approach the court takes to reading the breadth of the 
statutory preclusions. While some judges may have claimed to conduct 
straight textual reading of the preclusions, many others, including Judge 
Hawkins, examined the context of the preclusions and worried about the 
unfettered scope of agency action if the preclusion causes were read too 
broadly. 
In an early case where the government argued that all review was 
precluded, Judge Hawkins held that notwithstanding a bar on a direct 
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, the respondent had the right to 
seek habeas review in the district court to determine if his constitutional 
rights had been violated in the original immigration hearing. 94 In Dearinger 
ex rel. Volkova v. INS, a writ of habeas corpus was raised on behalf of the 
asylum seeker.95 Judge Hawkins held that the district court had jurisdiction 
over the habeas claim, and jurisdiction was not precluded by the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act ("IIRIRA").96 In 
concluding that jurisdiction was valid, Judge Hawkins analyzed the 
petitioner's claim of error based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 97 
Judge Hawkins located the right to counsel in deportation proceedings as 
91. See David R. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and National Act: 
Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75 (2007) 
(written by a senior attorney in the Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Rights Division, 
Department of Justice, discussing history of Congressional attempts to control access to the 
federal courts and judicial review of immigration cases). 
92. See Kanstroom, supra note 51 (discussing limitation on judicial review of 
discretionary decisions). 
93. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 5; Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, 
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 988 (1998). 
94. Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). 
95. Id. at 1044. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1044-45. 
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arising under the Fifth Amendment. 98 He went on to hold that where an 
alien is prevented from filing an appeal in immigration proceedings due to 
counsel's error, the error deprives the alien of the appellate process entirely 
and prejudice is presumed. 99 Judge Hawkins rejected the Government's 
argument that due process in immigration does not require an appeal to the 
U.S. court of appeals. 100 His reasoning was that just because an alien may 
not have a constitutional right to an appeal, there may still be a 
constitutional violation where deprivation of the right is ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 101 
Even if attorney error did not prevent access to the federal courts, 
Congress has also blocked that access by precluding or dramatically 
limiting judicial review of many immigration decisions. Perhaps one of the 
most dramatic examples illustrating Congressional "court stripping" 102 is 
the Ninth Circuit opinion in Meng Li v. Eddy. 103 In this case, a Chinese 
business woman, Ms. Meng Li, presented a valid passport and a visa for a 
business visit (B-1) to the U.S. inspectors in Anchorage, Alaska. 104 
Although her ultimate destination was New York, the government inspected 
all foreign passengers before allowing them to proceed to flights in the 
interior of the United States. 105 Ms. Li had also applied to INS for 
classification as an L-1 intracompany transferee; while her flight was 
heading for the United States, that petition was approved, but Ms. Li was 
unaware of the approval. 106 When Ms. Li reached Anchorage, the 
immigration inspector accused Ms. Li of fraud, but would not tell her why; 
it later came to light that the inspector thought incorrectly that a person with 





102. "Court stripping" or "jurisdiction stripping" is a reference to statutes that block access 
to judicial review. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1043 (2010). 
103. 259 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and appeal dismissed by Liv. Eddy, 324 F.3d 
1109 (9th Cir. 2003). This case was vacated as moot because more than five years passed from 
the time of the original exclusion order and according to the government Ms. Li would suffer no 
further consequences of the order. The Court perhaps misunderstands that any order of 
exclusion can later be a basis for determining whether an individual is subject to permanent bars 
to admission to the U.S. for material misrepresentation or fraud. See generally INA § 
212(a)(6)(c), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011). 
104. Li, 259 F.3d at 1133. 
105. Id. 
106. Email from Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, University of Alaska Anchorage to 
Lenni Benson, Professor of Law, New York Law School (Oct. 29, 2010) (on file with author). 
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approved on the person's behalf. 107 Ms. Li did not speak fluent English, but 
tried to explain to the inspectors that she was traveling to New York on 
behalf of her Chinese employer, a real estate developer. 108 In New York she 
expected to complete negotiations for the purchase of materials and fixtures 
for shipment to China. 109 The inspector apparently misunderstood the law 
related to B-1 and L-1 visas and after questioning Ms. Li, informed her that 
she was going to be returned to China on the next available flight and that 
she was formally ordered excluded from the United States. 110 The Ninth 
Circuit majority opinion described the inspector's findings as follows: 
The order itself was issued on a form stating that the INS had 
determined the named alien to be excludable because of an attempt 
to enter the country through fraud or misrepresentation. The form 
included a space for a description of the nature of the fraud or 
misrepresentation, but the INS left that space blank in Li's 
order. 111 
After hearing she was to be excluded, Ms. Li became distraught and the 
interpreter told the inspector that Ms. Li was afraid to return to China. 112 
Apparently, the interpreter believed the only way to delay Ms. Li's 
departure was to have her seek political asylum. 113 The interpreter was not 
completely incorrect because the statute and regulations provide that 
expedited removal cannot be used if a person has a "credible fear" of 
returning to his or her country of origin. 114 
Upon hearing incorrectly from the interpreter that Ms. Li was afraid to 
return to China, the inspector transferred Ms. Li to the local jail until she 
could be interviewed by a member of the asylum corps. 115 While she was 
being held in the local jail, Ms. Li met attorney Margaret Stock, who had 
been called by Ms. Li's company and asked to find out what had 
107. Li, 259 F.3d at 1133. 
108. Id. at 1136. 
109. Benson, New World of Judicial Review, supra note 5, at 246 & n.82. 
110. Expedited Removal is a streamlined procedure where no immigration court hearing is 
involved in admissibility determinations. See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (Westlaw 
through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011). 
111. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). 
112. Anthony Lewis, Abroad At Home, It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, 
Editorial Page; Telephone Interview with Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, University of 
Alaska Anchorage (Oct. 29, 2010); Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106. 
113. Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106. 
114. INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 235(b)(4) (Westlaw through Feb. 24, 2011). In 
theory, an expedited removal order could be stopped if the inspector's supervisor does not 
concur in the assessment of the inspector. See 8 C.F.R. § 235(b)(7). 
115. Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106. 
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happened. 116 Ms. Li explained that the officer refused to accept her business 
visitor visa and that she didn't know why she was injail. 117 Ms. Stock then 
learned from INS that they were holding Ms. Li for a credible fear 
interview. Ms. Li was adamant that she was not afraid to return to China 
and did not want to apply for asylum in the United States. Although Ms. 
Stock attempted to speak to the inspectors informally and ask them to 
rescind the expedited removal order, the Anchorage District Office 
refused. 118 Ms. Stock filed a habeas petition challenging the erroneous 
determination of the inspector that Ms. Li was not a bona fide tourist for 
business purposes. 119 
Prior to the 1996 changes, if a business visitor or other non-immigrant 
visa holder was told by an inspector that he or she would not be admitted to 
the United States, the individual had the right to seek review of that 
inspector's decision before an immigration judge. 120 If the immigration 
judge affirmed the agency determination that the person lacked the proper 
visa or was otherwise subject to a ground of inadmissibility, the individual 
could challenge the exclusion order by filing a habeas petition in federal 
district court. 121 The statutory authority for this habeas review was part of 
the INA former§ 106. 122 In 1996, Congress created a new form of exclusion 
proceedings for two categories of applicants for admission: (1) people who 
lacked documents or presented false documents and people who the 
inspector found to be making a material misrepresentation; 123 or (2) people 
who engaged in fraud in connection with their admission application. 124 The 
new expedited removal system authorizes the inspector to determine 
whether an individual is subject to either of these grounds of exclusion and 





120. See Benson, New World of Judicial Review, supra note 5 (discussing the procedures 
available prior to 1996 reforms). 
121. Id. 
122. INA§ 106 (repealed 1996). 
123. The specific ground is found in INA § 212(a)(7) and 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(7). INA § 
212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(7) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011). 
124. The specific ground of inadmissibility is found in INA § 212(a)(6)(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(c) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010). 
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (Westlaw through Feb. 11, 2011) (Stating that "[a]ny 
removal order entered by an examining immigration officer pursuant to section 235(b)(l) of the 
Act must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is considered 
final. Such supervisory review shall not be delegated below the level of the second line 
supervisor, or a person acting in that capacity. The supervisory review shall include a review of 
the sworn statement and any answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of 
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individual to be removed. 126 The impact of an expedited removal order is 
that the individual is barred from seeking readmission to the United States 
for five years. 127 Potentially, the impact is permanent if the ground used to 
sustain inadmissibility was fraud or misrepresentation because that finding 
could be used to bar future applications for visas or admission to the United 
States. 128 Finally, to ensure that the removal proceeds quickly, Congress 
eliminated the role of the immigration court except for people who made a 
claim of a credible fear of persecution or harm if they were to be 
retumed. 129 Later, by regulation, the agency expanded these exceptions to 
individuals claiming to be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or 
persons already granted asylee or refugee status and seeking readmission to 
the United States. 130 As a safeguard, Congress created a narrow grant of 
specific habeas review in INA § 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), that allows 
review as follows: 
(2) Habeas corpus proceedings 
Judicial review of any determination made under section 
1225(b)(l) of this title is available in habeas corpus proceedings, 
but shall be limited to determinations of-
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien, 
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such 
section, and 
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee under section 
1157 of this title, or has been granted asylum under section 1158 
of this title, such status not having been terminated, and is entitled 
to such further inquiry as prescribed by the Attorney General 
pursuant to section 1225(b)(l)(C) of this title. 131 
removal or return. The supervisory review and approval of an expedited removal order for an 
alien described in section 235(b)(l)(A)(iii) of the Act must include a review of any claim of 
lawful admission or parole and any evidence or information presented to support such a claim, 
prior to approval of the order. In such cases, the supervisor may request additional information 
from any source and may require further interview of the alien.") 
126. 8 C.F.R. §235.3(b)(2) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010). 
127. INA§ 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011). 
128. Id. 
129. INA § 235(b){l){A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225{b){l)(A)(i) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, 
approved 2011); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(ii) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010). 
130. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5). 
131. INA§ 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e). 
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Ms. Li filed a habeas petition using both the specific provision of the 
INA and the general federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 132 The 
District Court rejected the habeas petition, flatly stating that Congress had 
meant to insulate all expedited removal decisions from judicial review 
unless the individual was a citizen or lawful permanent resident. 133 Ms. Li 
then filed a petition for review of the denial of habeas. 134 The Ninth Circuit 
majority affirmed the lower court and found that Congress had intended to 
preclude judicial review. 135 The court ruled that normal habeas review had 
been expressly limited to the form and content found in the INA alone. 136 
The majority also rejected Ms. Li's argument that her removal violated 
procedural due process, finding that an alien who is at the border of the 
United States and not yet formally admitted into the interior is not entitled 
to the protections of procedural due process. 137 
Judge Hawkins wrote a powerful dissent that reveals his philosophical 
approach to preserving the role of the court as a guarantor of fair agency 
procedure and to ensure the agency acts within its statutory power. Using 
conservative canons of statutory construction and the earlier decisions of 
the Ninth Circuit, particularly Magana-Pizano 138 preserving the ability of 
132. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2001). 
133. Id. at 1136. 
134. Id. at 1132. Statutory habeas is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appeal of a federal 
denial of habeas can be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Here Ms. Stock argued that both this 
statute and the INA guarantee of habeas within INA § 242(b) authorized judicial review of 
whether the government had the authority to use expedited removal in this factual context. 
135. Li, 259 F.3d at 1134-35. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1136. Physical presence within the interior has long been a constitutional 
dividing line, limiting the rights of non-citizens not yet admitted to the territory of the U.S. The 
Ninth Circuit specifically noted that it was not considering whether an individual subjected to 
expedited removal procedures who was in the United States might have due process protections. 
See id. at 1135. This is an important limitation because the expedited removal procedures are 
used within the physical borders of the United States. People apprehended within 100 miles of 
the international border who cannot establish they have been in the U.S. for at least fourteen 
days or people who have entered illegally by sea who cannot establish that they have been in the 
U.S. for at least two years are subject to expedited removal procedures. See Designating Aliens 
for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-81 (proposed Aug. 11, 2004); Notice Designating 
Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(l)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924-25 (proposed Nov. 13, 2002). The expedited removal 
procedure could, in time, produce more removal orders that the entire removal procedure before 
the immigration courts. In fiscal year 2009, 27% of all removal orders were issued by expedited 
removal procedures as opposed to court procedures. See DHS ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
statistics/publications/enforcement_ ar _ 2009 .pdf. 
As expedited removal becomes more prevalent it is likely collateral and direct attacks on the 
fairness of the procedure will grow. 
138. See Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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people to raise jurisdictional arguments challenging the sweeping 
jurisdictional bars, Judge Hawkins found that Congress had not precluded a 
limited form of statutory habeas within the INA: 
Congress can expressly remove habeas review, but that is not 
what it did in § 1252(e)(2). Rather, Congress limited our review. 
In such a situation, we retain jurisdiction to determine whether we 
have jurisdiction, just as in part II of Magana-Pizano. The only 
way that we can determine whether Li was "ordered removed 
under [§ 1225]," § 1252(e)(2)(B), and "whether such an order in 
fact was issued,"§ 1252(e)(5), is to determine whether INS has, to 
whatever extent, identified any conduct that offends§ 1225. Thus, 
the reasoning of part II of Magana-Pizano should control this 
case-the legal satisfaction of statutory predicates has to be 
determined to establish jurisdiction. 139 
Earlier in the decision, Judge Hawkins framed the issue as: 
The majority argues that § 1252(e)(2)(B) "does not appear to 
permit the court to inquire into whether section 1225(b)(l) was 
properly invoked, but only whether it was invoked at all." If true, 
this means that INS [now DHS] can issue an expedited removal 
order for any alien seeking to enter the United States (other than a 
permanent resident, refugee, or asylum-seeker) for any reason, 
including clearly improper grounds such as racial or ethnic bias, 
and the courts cannot review the legal basis of that order. A 
careful reading of § 1252(e)(2)(B), grounded in the overall 
expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA, coupled with our 
precedent interpreting similar review provisions, compels the 
opposite result. 140 
While the majority opinion acknowledges Judge Hawkins's critique, it 
refused to allow any check on whether the government is properly using the 
expedited removal procedure. 141 Judge Hawkins's dissent is grounded in 
traditional cannons of statutory construction such as reading the statute 
consistently and reading all of the provisions rather than isolating terms in a 
particular subsection, but his analysis is clearly informed by a pragmatic 
awareness that power wielded in the shadows may become abusive. In the 
years that have followed, concern has grown that expedited removal is 
being used inappropriately and that the process is almost entirely invisible 
139. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
140. Id. at 1138 (alteration in original). 
141. Id. at 1135. 
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to external review. 142 Judge Hawkins wisely foresaw that if the courts 
rejected challenges that assert that the agency acted in excess of its 
authority, the culture and behavior within the agency might exceed the 
narrow parameters Congress intended. 
There are other examples of Judge Hawkins's efforts to preserve access 
to the federal courts. In 2005, Congress once again revised the judicial 
review provisions of the INA. 143 After the U.S. Supreme Court found that 
for those individuals who could not seek judicial review of a removal order 
in the courts of appeals, access to the federal courts remained via a writ of 
habeas corpus; 144 Congress passed the REAL ID Act that restored petitions 
for review for most applicants who had previously been barred as a 
constitutional substitute for habeas review. 145 The statutory change also 
altered the scope of review to specifically include challenges raising 
"constitutional claims or questions of law." 146 Soon litigation arose 
questioning the meaning of "questions of law." Could a petitioner challenge 
mixed questions of law and fact? Could agency decisions, which included 
legal conclusions that appear unsupported by the factual record, be 
reviewed by the federal courts of appeal? In Ramadan v. Gonzales, 147 Judge 
Hawkins and two other members of the Ninth Circuit, in a case of first 
impression, addressed one of the critical questions about the scope of the 
REAL ID changes. Ms. Ramadan applied for asylum, but filed her 
application more than one year after entry to the United States. 148 The INA 
specifically allows an immigration judge to accept a late filing but only if 
the judge finds that the late filing was based on "exceptional 
circumstances."149 The statute and regulations have basically created two 
types of exceptions: (1) country conditions have changed justifying a late 
142. Congress did create a special commission to study the impact of expedited removal on 
asylum claims. That commission issued a very critical report. See U.S. COMM. ON INT'L 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2005), available 
at http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com _ content&task=view&id= 1892. The ABA 
Commission on Immigration has also repeatedly questioned the validity and accuracy of 
expedited removal. In a recent report the Commission calls for the restoration of immigration 
judge review, increased use of asylum officers for those presenting claims of fear or persecution 
and restoration of judicial review. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, at 
pt. 4. 
143. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)(l)(A)(iii) (2005) 
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2008)). 
144. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
145. REAL ID Act§ 106(a)(l)(A)(iii). 
146. Id. 
147. 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007). 
148. Id. at 649. 
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011) 
(describing exceptional or changed circumstances); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B). 
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filing; or (2) the applicant faced exceptional circumstances that interfered 
with her ability to prepare and file a claim. 15° Congress also specifically 
precluded judicial review of the immigration judge's determination about 
whether one of the statutory circumstances could be met in INA § 
208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l 158(a)(3). 151 Judge Hawkins wrote the first opinion 
in this case and concluded that while the REAL ID amendments had 
expanded judicial review of matters that had previously been precluded, the 
Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider whether or not Ms. Ramadan 
had met her burden to establish an exception for a late filing because she 
had not presented a claim involving a legal question-a claim involving a 
statutory interpretation. 152 The opinion was also careful to note that Ms. 
Ramadan had not made the argument that the immigration judge decision 
was so unfair or arbitrary that it would have violated procedural due 
process. 153 
In a rather unusual procedure, the panel accepted a motion for rehearing. 
The case was reargued and amici curiae entered the case. 154 The same panel 
issued a per curiam decision rejecting their earlier position. 155 Judge 
Hawkins and the other members of the panel had clearly changed their view 
of the scope of judicial review after the REAL ID amendments. The per 
curiam panel now issued a very careful assessment of the statutory purposes 
of REAL ID and whether, as required by St. Cyr and the habeas corpus 
clause, judicial review of "questions of law" included mixed questions of 
law and fact. 156 The opinion goes into detail of the evolution of judicial 
review of immigration cases and the traditional content of habeas review. 157 
It also examines the legislative history and the conference committee report 
discussing the scope of review. 158 The per curiam opinion states: 
Because the Conference Report indicates congressional adherence 
to St. Cyr' s constitutional mandates, and because preclusion of 
judicial review over mixed questions of law and fact would raise 
150. 8 U.S.C. § l 158(a)(2)(B)-(D). 
151. 151 CONG. REC. H2813-0l, H2873 (daily ed. May 3, 2005) (statement of Rep. Lewis), 
2005 WL 1025891 (emphasis added) (cited in Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th 
Cir. 2005)). 
152. Ramadan, 427 F.3d at 1222. 
153. Id at 1222 n.6. 
154. The ACLU Foundation Immigrant Rights Project and the American Immigration Law 
Foundation both appeared as amici. Both organizations had been actively litigating the contours 
of the jurisdictional barriers since the first major restrictions appeared in 1996. 
155. The panel consisted of Judge Hawkins, Judge Pregerson and Judge Thomas. Ramadan 
v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (2007). 
156. Id. at 650-55. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
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serious constitutional questions under St. Cyr, the legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended to grant review over such 
questions. Cf Chen, 471 F.3d at 378-28 (holding that because 
historical habeas review extended beyond statutory construction, 
as indicated in St. Cyr, the scope of "questions of law" of the Real 
ID Act was similarly extended). Indeed, the Conference Report 
explicitly envisions judicial review of mixed questions of law and 
fact, stating: "When a court is presented with a mixed question of 
law and fact, the court should analyze it to the extent that there are 
legal elements, but should not review any factual elements." Id. at 
175. This statement squarely fits within our holding, which 
mandates review only when the underlying facts are undisputed. 159 
33 
In the end, rather like poor Mr. Marbury, 160 the court found jurisdiction, 
but no relief for the petition. 161 Ms. Ramadan did not win her petition for 
review. The panel found that as a matter of law, her particular undisputed 
factual argument about changed conditions did not directly relate to the 
basis of her application for asylum and therefore she had not presented a 
qualifying changed circumstance justifying a late application. 162 Still, the 
opinion is a very important one in examining the power of willing judges to 
narrowly construe restraints on federal court jurisdiction. 
The government sought en bane redetermination but an insufficient 
number of judges voted to rehear en bane and the case ended. 163 Judge 
O'Scannlain wrote a dissent, primarily arguing that the opinion extended 
jurisdiction beyond the narrow grounds restored by Congress or mandated 
by the habeas minimum. 164 He was joined by eight other members of the 
court. 165 The Ramadan II decision also stands largely alone as all but the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected any ability to review the 
determination of an immigration judge that an asylum application was 
untimely. 166 
159. Id. at 653. 
160. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
161. Technically in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall found the court had 
jurisdiction to determine that as a matter of constitutional law it was unconstitutional for 
Congress to have created original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. See id. 
162. Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 658. 
163. Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2007). 
164. Id. at 973-74 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
165. Id. at 973. 
166. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Chen v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, 471 F.3d 
315, 329 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL ID Act did allow review of mixed issues of law and 
fact. In later cases, the Second Circuit appears to have also narrowed its review of mixed issues 
of law and fact to only review the legal elements. See Gui Yin Liu v. l.N.S, 508 F.3d 716, 722 
n.3 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Jessamyn L. Vogel, Note, Ending the Tug of War Between Congress 
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This case presents another example where Judge Hawkins and other 
members of the Ninth Circuit understood the importance of the petitioner's 
ability to challenge the agency's application of procedural and legal 
standards. Judge Hawkins's original decision already demonstrated a 
sensitivity to the need to preserve review if the agency had acted in a 
manner that curtailed due process of law and the later, important per curiam 
decision, indicates that with due respect to the Congressional intent and 
statutory language, the court was equally concerned with preserving the 
ability to right erroneous legal determinations. 
It would be an error to state that Judge Hawkins will always creatively 
read the INA to the advantage of the non-citizen. In fact, in several 
important cases, Judge Hawkins found that the INA denies relief to 
individuals who many would find quite sympathetic. For example, in the 
case of Mr. Moreno, Judge Hawkins rejected the argument that extreme and 
exceptional hardship to his grandchildren, children that he had raised as part 
of his immediate family, could qualify them as his children under the 
INA. 167 Mr. Moreno lived in the United States for more than ten years and 
was eligible to seek cancellation of removal, but only if he could show 
hardship to a U.S. citizen's or a permanent resident's "spouse, parent or 
child." 168 Although Mr. Moreno had been awarded legal custody of his five 
U.S. citizen grandchildren, he had not formally adopted the children. 169 The 
Immigration Judge found that short of adoption, Mr. Moreno did not have a 
qualifying relative in order to seek cancellation and the resulting permanent 
resident status. 170 Judge Hawkins's opinion carefully considered the 
statutory interpretation arguments and reviews of prior Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court decisions that followed the strict definitions of the INA in 
defining qualifying family relationships. One can sense Judge Hawkins's 
and the Ninth Circuit's empathy for Mr. Moreno in its concluding 
paragraphs as the court found that grandchildren were not qualifying 
children as defined in the cancellation statute: 
Though this result-separating five U.S. citizen children from 
their grandfather, who appears to be their only loving and stable 
source of care and support-may seem unduly harsh and perhaps 
illogical, it is the result dictated by law. Congress is of course free 
and the Courts: Discerning the Reviewability of "Changed or Extraordinary Circumstances" 
within Section 106 of the REAL ID Act of 2005, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 285 (2008). 
167. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007). 
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D) (Westalw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011). 
169. Moreno-Morante, 490 F.3d at 1174. 
170. Id. 
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to correct any inequities resulting from our application of its plain 
statutory language, as it has done in the past. ... 
Moreno's grandchildren thus do not meet the statutory definition 
of "child" for purposes of cancellation of removal. Neither do they 
qualify by virtue of his de facto parent-child relationship with 
them because Congress has specifically precluded such a 
functional approach to defining the term "child" for cancellation 
ofremoval purposes. 171 
35 
In the footnote I omitted in the above quotation, Judge Hawkins gave an 
example where Congress acted to overturn a particularly harsh bright line 
test in the INA. 172 This opinion and others repeatedly demonstrate that 
while Judge Hawkins is willing to carefully consider the statutory limits of 
the INA, there are simply times when only Congress has the authority to 
remold the terms and conditions of the law. 
IV. STANDING UP FOR FAIRNESS 
As I have written, if there is a broad theme in the immigration opinions 
of Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, it is that he recognizes the need for fair 
procedures. In an interview with one of his former partners, Roxana C. 
Bacon, she said: 
Immigration law has been my entire career. Mike made time to 
listen to my cases, too often stories of administrative law gone off 
the rails. Mike understands that recourse to federal courts is often 
the only opportunity immigrants have to level the playing field. 
His varied professional and personal experience informs his deep 
appreciation of the ordinary person's need for law as a protector of 
rights. Championing the rights of immigrants in a bureaucratic 
system whose rigidity is matched only by its intricacy is 
commitment to due process writ large. There is no reward for such 
allegiance other than the satisfaction of using law as a tool for 
justice. 173 
171. Id. at 1178 (footnote omitted). 
172. He references the Congressional amendment restoring the ability of an individual to 
qualify for suspension of deportation, a precursor to cancellation, even if he or she had brief and 
casual departures. Id. at 1178 n. l 0. The Congressional amendment reversed the Supreme 
Court's literal reading of the prior statute that no departure in the seven year residence period 
could be allowed. Id. (discussing the overruling of I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)). 
173. Interview with Roxana C. Bacon, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Citizenship 
and Immigration Ctr. (Aug. 28, 2010). Roxana Bacon was a partner with Judge Hawkins in 
three different law firms. She retired from private practice in 2009. She came out of retirement 
to serve in the government. She became the General Counsel for the Department of Homeland 
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During our discussion, Judge Hawkins and I agreed that his upbringing 
in Winslow, Arizona, a hardscrabble town in Northern Arizona, and his 
success in different and challenging environments made him a unique 
federal judge. His varied professional and personal experience informs his 
deep appreciation of the ordinary person's need for law as a protector of 
rights. Playing baseball in the rural West means you understand how a non-
contact sport can be played so hard it draws blood. Graduating at the top of 
the class at Arizona State University means you have your eye on the prize. 
Everyone in law knows that serving in the Marine Corps is not for the faint-
hearted. Managing successful campaigns in places where the Minutemen 
stand proud requires every strategic skill. Being the U.S. Attorney who 
invokes civil rights laws to bring brutal criminals to justice defines 
professional integrity and courage. Roxana Bacon commented, "Now I read 
his thoughtful and well-crafted opinions with particular pleasure because I 
trace his roots through his prose. Mike's multiple careers and interests are 
never flaunted, but they are the bedrock for his view that law is the fulcrum 
for fairness." 174 
Judge Hawkins has also made a lasting contribution to the adjudication 
process. Juan Osuna, former chair of the BIA, wrote to me: 
Judge Hawkins in particular has always stressed the paramount 
necessity for robust adjudication at the administrative level, as a 
way of giving the federal courts confidence that the immigrants' 
claims are being handled appropriately, carefully and according to 
due process protections. His insights and those of other federal 
judges have been invaluable to immigration judges and the BIA. 
His actions and efforts represent those of a true public servant. He 
saw a problem represented by the rising caseload, engaged in a 
productive way with the various players in the system, provided 
useful feedback that has helped improve the system. 175 
After reading the past fifteen years of Judge Hawkins immigration cases, 
and considering his published opinions as well as many of the memorandum 
decisions issued by panels including Judge Hawkins, it is clear that the 
Ninth Circuit has been and continues to be one of the most important 
developers of immigration law. Unfortunately, the law is developed in a 
cauldron overflowing with cases in a murky soup of administrative 
opinions, constitutional law, and narrow opportunities for judicial review. 
The restrictions on judicial review make it particularly difficult for courts to 
Security, Citizenship and Immigration Service and left office at the end of 2010. Her comment 
is personal and not meant to represent any official view of the federal government. 
174. Id. 
175. Interviews and Emails with Juan Osuna, supra note 16. 
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play a significant role in the development of immigration law. Yet, 
attorneys are likely to keep trying to find a way to expand individual rights 
in immigration law as significant immigration reform does not appear to be 
a political priority in the winter of 2010. 176 It is to be hoped that Senior 
Judge Hawkins will not give up his efforts to improve immigration 
adjudication within the administrative courts charged with adjudicating 
immigration claims and the Ninth Circuit. Knowing his lifelong pattern of 
standing up for principle and fairness, I believe we can expect to be learning 
from Judge Hawkins's opinions and actions for many years to come. 
176. For a recent symposium addressing possible restructuring or other administrative 
reforms in immigration adjudication, see the Fortieth Annual Administrative Law Symposium, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010), in particular, Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
A<!judication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the 
A<!judication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010); and Russel L. Wheeler, 
Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third Branch Analytic 
Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847 (2010). 
*** 
